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NOTES
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF STATE COURT
ADJUDICATION OF PATENT ISSUES AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS' CHOICE OF PRECLUSION
LAWS
Dutch D. Chung*
INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 ("FCIA"), 1 it created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC") to instill greater uniformity in the application of the
patent laws.2 State preclusion laws represent one of the thorniest
examples of how the local rules of each state can impede the CAFC's
ability to fulfill its function. Although most state law causes of action,
which collaterally implicate patent law issues, are brought to federal
court after asserting federal jurisdiction based on diversity or federal
question, some plaintiffs may find state court to be a more favorable
and convenient forum.3 Because the plaintiff is "the master of the
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J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2001. The author would like to thank
Eric Woglom, Esq., Partner at Fish & Neave, for helping to direct him towards this
interesting and unsettled area of law, Professor Tracy Higgins for her thoughtful
comments and suggestions, and most importantly, Shawn-Marie Mayrand for her
support and encouragement. The views expressed in this Note are entirely those of
the author.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 3-7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13-17
[hereinafter S. Rep. No. 275] (expressing Congress' desire to instill greater national
uniformity in the application of the United States patent laws); see also Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (noting that since the
Patent Act of 1800, Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising
under the patent laws to federal courts to "allow] for the development of a uniform
body of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and public
access").
3. A random sampling of civil cases brought in five federal district courts and at
least one state court in each federal district showed that plaintiffs prevailed more
often in state court than in federal court. See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William
L. F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer, and Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary
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claim," these plaintiffs may "avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive
reliance on state law" to establish a cause of action.' If there is no
diversity among parties or if the case is filed in the defendant's home
state, the plaintiff could foreclose the defendant from removing the
case to federal district court, and thereby deprive the defendant of a
more defendant-friendly forum.6 In view of the potential advantages
of litigating in state court, a plaintiff wishing to collaterally attack the
validity and enforceability of a patent may find it more convenient to
sue in state court on a business tort claim. The plaintiff may allege
inequitable conduct in the complaint and at least one non-patent law
theory under which it could prevail, even though it may have no
evidence to support that theory.7
Once in state court, a plaintiff, conceding that he has insufficient
evidence to try the non-patent theory, could then rely solely on the
patent issue to establish a state law claim. The case would not arise
under the patent laws, and thus, would not be removable to federal
court.8 Assuming the plaintiff does not submit any evidence to try the
non-patent law theory and prevails, the state court would have
necessarily decided the patent law issue against the defendant.9 Most
disturbingly, if the state's preclusion laws gave preclusive effect to the
state court findings on the patent law issue, the plaintiff could
arguably assert that the full faith and credit statute requires that the
state court's adverse decision against the defendant's patent be given
nationwide preclusive effect.10 The decision would not be reviewable
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72, 75, 118 (1983); see also Michael E. Solimine, The
Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 54-55, 66 (1998) (finding
that defendants fare somewhat better in federal than in state courts). In addition,
state court litigation provides a higher ratio of recovery to attorney fees. See Trubek
et al., supra, at 110-14. Moreover, state court litigation costs less because attorneys
require less time than a similar case in federal court. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Joel B.
Grossman, Elizabeth McNichol, David M. Trubek, and Austin Sarat, Court and
Litigation Investment: Why Do Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 Just.
Sys. J. 7, 8 (1984) (citing David M. Trubek et al., Civil Litigation Research Project
Final Report, 11-58, 11-59, 11-138 (1983)).
4. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,392 (1987).
5. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (establishing
complete diversity rule); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) (forbidding removal by
defendants that are citizens of the state where the action is brought). The filing in a
state court of a counterclaim for patent infringement alone will not support removal
to federal court. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Rich, J., sitting by designation), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom. Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text (discussing the legal basis for
this strategy of avoiding federal court jurisdiction through artful pleading).
8. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
9. See Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Charles Alan
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4421, at 192 (1981); Charles Alan Wright,
Law of Federal Courts 725 (1994).
10. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) ("For claim and
issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes... the judgment of the rendering State gains
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by the CAFC, the very court that Congress created to ensure
uniformity in the application of the patent laws."
The full faith and credit statute, codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
mandates that the preclusive effect of state court findings in federal
court should be governed by the choice of preclusion laws of the state
from which the judgment was rendered. 2 If § 1738 is applied strictly,
it may be quite possible to have essentially the same facts in cases
from different states, but the federal courts, including the CAFC, may
be compelled to reach contradictory conclusions solely because of
each state's preclusion laws.13 Whether there is sufficient authority to
insulate federal courts from the effect of state court judgments on
patent issues has not been decided or fully explored.
To answer this question, Part I of this Note will present an overview
of the United States patent system. To help explain the underlying
bases of the modern Congressional goals for placing patent law within
exclusive federal jurisdiction and creating the CAFC, Part II will
explore the history of the jurisdictional exclusivity of the patent laws
and the context for the formation of the CAFC. Part II will then
examine the circumstances under which a complainant may assert a
cause of action based on rights granted by a patent. Lastly, Part II will
discuss the relevance of patent law questions to the jurisdiction of
state courts. Part IlI will review the function and goals of the full faith
and credit statute. In view of the requirements of the full faith and
credit statute, Part IV will examine the potential implications of a
state court decision on a patent law issue by reviewing the opinions
expressed by the Supreme Court and CAFC. In addition, Part IV will
examine the test enunciated by the Supreme Court to determine when
the full faith and credit statute should apply. Upon analyzing the
deficiencies of the Court's test, a balancing test that more properly
weighs the competing interests at stake in resolving this question is
suggested. Part V will first argue that giving federal courts freedom to
develop and follow federal common law is more desirable than
binding them to the laws of each state on patent questions decided by
the state courts. Part V will then argue that federal courts have the
power to formulate and adopt federalized choice of preclusion laws
nationwide force [under the full faith and credit obligation].").
11. See infra Part II.B.
12- See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)
("It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ
their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments.") (quoting
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982)); MGA, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729,732 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
13. While the essential elements of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion
may be quite similar across jurisdictions, differences exist that can lead to contrary
outcomes depending on which jurisdiction's preclusion laws are applied. See Howard
M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 Mich. L Rev. 945, 963-83 (1998)
(discussing divergences in the preclusion laws of different jurisdictions).
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when faced with patent questions adjudicated by state courts. This
Note concludes that federal courts have sufficient authority to
determine their own preclusion laws, and that they must not be
hamstrung by the full faith and credit statute if they are to comply
with Congress' goal of making the patent laws more uniform,
predictable, and stable. 14
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT LAWS
A patent is often viewed as a form of a social contract between an
inventor and society.15 In exchange for disclosing the inventor's
discovery, society grants the inventor a monopoly for a limited time
on the disclosed invention. 16 Specifically, society provides the owner
of a patent an exclusive right for a limited time to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention.17
Although the Constitution gives Congress the broad power to
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries," its power to grant
patents is constitutionally limited to inventions that "promote the
Progress of ... useful Arts."1" Pursuant to its early power to grant
14. See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text; see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1, 63 n.324 (1989) (noting that the CAFC must possess the authority to develop its
own procedural rules to address the unique problems it faces as a court with
specialized jurisidiction).
15. 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §§ 15, 20
(1890).
16. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989);
see Robinson, supra note 15, at § 20.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994); 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) ("Whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.., during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) ("A
patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent."); 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2)(1994) (stating that a patent "shall be for a term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed in the United States...").
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. The Supreme Court further explained in Graham
v. John Deere Co. that:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge
the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional
command must "promote the Progress of... useful Arts." This is the
standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.
383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
373 (1996) (describing the statutory requirements imposed by Congress to obtain a
patent pursuant to Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution); Anderson's Black Rock,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (stating that "[tihe patent
[Vol. 69
2000] FEDERAL COURTS AND PRECLUSION LAWS 711
patents, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790,19 which provided
that the patentability of an invention was to be determined by review
of a patent application submitted to three high-level government
officials.20
The review is performed presently by professional examiners
working for the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO").2' Under the current patent statutory provisions, the patent
application must contain sufficient description to teach one of
ordinary skill in the art how to best make and use a useful, new, and
non-obvious invention.' This part first reviews the statutory
requirements to obtain a patent for an invention, and then discusses
how the patentee may exploit his patent, once granted. Lastly, this
part explains why the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent
and the requirement of candor often remain an important
consideration in patent litigation, long after the patent is granted.
A. Statutory Requirements for Obtaining a Patent
An applicant seeking to obtain a patent must submit to the PTO a
patent application that meets the requirements of the patent statutes. 3
In particular, the application must include a written description of the
invention (sometimes referred to as the "specification") and claims!"
The claims specifically define the scope of the invention that the
applicant seeks to protect with a patent.? Once an application is
submitted to the PTO, an examiner reviews the application and
determines whether (1) the invention, as claimed, meets the statutory
provisions for patentability, and (2) the written description conforms
standard is basically constitutional," under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution).
19. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12; see also Robert Patrick Merges,
Patent Law and Policy 8-9 (2d ed. 1997) (reviewing the first patent statute passed by
Congress).
20. Merges, supra note 19, at 10.
21. See id. at 35.
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See generally Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-51 (1989) (reviewing the
conditions for securing a patent for an invention); 2 Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III,
Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 6:16 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter 2 Walker on Patents]
(discussing the conditions of patentability for an invention); see also Brian P.
O'Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus: Developing a New Approach for
Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 147 (1996) (discussing the disclosure
requirement to obtain the protection of a patent for an invention).
23. See 3 Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 9:1, at
11 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter 3 Walker on Patents].
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); 3 Walker on Patents, supra note 23, § 102.
25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996); Corning
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A
claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers
on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected
invention.").
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to the statutory written description requirements.26 If the examiner
finds that the application fails to meet the patent statute requirements,
the examiner can reject the application and request that the applicant
amend the application.27 Once the examiner finds that the application
complies with the patent statutes, the examiner may allow the
application to issue as a patent.' This process of obtaining a patent is
called patent "prosecution. 2
9
Whether a claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of
patentability depends upon three conditions. The claimed invention
must be: useful, new, and non-obvious.30  These requirements are
embodied respectively in three sections of the United States Code.31
Section 101 requires that the claimed invention be useful and fall
within at least one of the four statutory classes of subject matter-
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.32
While some have questioned and opposed allowing man-made
creations such as genetically engineered living organisms33 or financial
instruments34 to come under any of the statutory classes of subject
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112; Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and
Practice 7-31 (2d ed. 1995) (describing Patent Office procedures). See generally 4
Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 12 (3d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter 4 Walker on Patents].
27. See 4 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 11.03 (2000) [hereinafter
Chisum on Patents] (providing an overview of the PTO examination process).
28. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.311 (1998); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 17.
29. Merges, supra note 19, at 35.
30. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 49.
31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
32. Section 101 states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machines, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent... subject to the conditions and
requirement of [Title 35]." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
33. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Michael D. Davis, The
Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 293 (1995); see
also Robert S. Wasowski, The Evolution of Patentable Compositions of Matter: The
United States Patent Office Accepts Genetically Altered Animals as Patentable Subject
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. Section 101, 2 Admin. L.J. 309, 326-27 (1988) (citing
justifications advanced by critics of patenting of genetically altered organisms); Philip
M. Boffey, Concern Over Genetics Prompts a New Coalition of Critics, N.Y. Times,
June 9. 1987, at Cl; Mark Crawford, Religious Groups Join Animal Patent Battle, 237
Science 480, 480 (1987) ("'The gift of life from God, in all its forms and species,
should not be regarded solely as if it were a chemical product, subject to genetic
alteration and patentable for economic benefit."') (quoting A. Brouwer, General
Secretary of the National Council of Churches).
34. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (overruling cases holding or suggesting that patent claims directed to
methods of doing business were not patentable), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999);
Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited
Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &
Ent. L.J. 61 (1999). See also Claus D. Melarti, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.: Ought the Mathematical Algorithm and Business
Method Exceptions Return To Business As Usual?, 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 359 (1999) for a
review of the patentability of business methods.
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matter,35 the courts have consistently construed the statutory classes to
include virtually "anything under the sun that is made by man."36
Because § 101 has been so broadly construed to encompass virtually
everything man-made,37 it essentially devolves into a utility
requirement. This requirement is generally met if the invention solves
a problem it was designed to solve.38
To be consistent with the constitutional goal of promoting the
useful arts, a patentable invention must not only be useful, but also
new.39 Section 102 indicates that a person is not entitled to a patent
for an invention if all the elements of the invention are present in a
single piece of relevant "prior art."'  This requirement that the
invention be novel is consistent with the notion that a patent is a
contract between society and the inventor; the inventor's disclosure of
something new is part of the necessary consideration for the grant of a
patent.4' Section 102 further enumerates the documents and acts that
constitute "prior art." Prior art may include, for example, printed
publications describing the invention before the inventor's date of
invention,4 2 or public use of the same invention by another before the
inventor's application filing date.43
Unlike § 102, which demands that a single piece of "prior art"
contain all the features of the claimed invention to render it
unpatentable,4 § 103 indicates that a patent may be denied for an
invention if it is obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of
one or more pieces of "prior art."45 Thus, even if an invention is new,
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
36. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep.
No. 1923, at 6 (1952)); see also State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375-77 (noting that
virtually anything with practical utility, including business methods, are patentable).
37. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309. The Court noted that "[this is not to suggest that
§ 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery." Id. For example, "It~he laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable because such
discoveries are merely manifestations of nature. Id.
38. See Merges, supra note 19, at 189. But see Schwartz, supra note 26, at 51
(noting that inventions that can only be used for immoral or illegal purposes, or that
are unsafe or result in only useless products are not considered useful).
39. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. 1998); Merges, supra note 19, at 221.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 102; Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Ubbey-Owens Ford Co., 758
F.2d 613, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1985); RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d
1440, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 52.
41. See Robinson, supra note 15, § 221.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
43. Id. § 102(b). See Sections 102(a) through 102(g) for a complete categorized
list of references that can constitute "prior art." Id. §§ 102(a)-102(g) (1994 & Supp.
1998).
44. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 619; RCA, 730 F.2d at 1449; Schwartz, supra
note 26, at 52.
45. Section 103(a) states in part that:
A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
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the advance may be so trivial that the invention would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the pertinent prior
art.' In such cases, the invention lacks sufficient merit to warrant
granting protection to the patent applicant.47 Determining when an
invention sufficiently "promote[s] the progress of... useful Arts" to
merit a patent, however, sometimes can be elusive.48
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,4 9 the Supreme Court provided a four-
step inquiry to aid with this determination.50 The inquiry comprises
(1) determining the scope and content of the relevant prior art, (2)
discerning the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art, (3) resolving the level of skill required to be a person of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and (4) evaluating the obviousness
of the claimed invention against the background of the first three
steps. 1 The Graham Court further indicated that "[s]uch secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the [invention] sought to be
patented.""2 While some courts interpreted Graham to mean that
secondary considerations should be used only in close cases, 3 the
CAFC has indicated that, provided a nexus exists between the
secondary considerations and the invention, the secondary
considerations should be considered before deciding whether an
invention is obvious. 4
In addition to the three basic requirements for patentability of an
invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 sets forth additional requirements for the
pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1966) (describing the test to apply and factors to consider in determining
whether a patent is non-obvious and patentable).
46. See 2 Walker on Patents, supra note 22, § 6:29, at 144-45.
47. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9. The obviousness requirement, which was
statutorily added in the 1952 Patent Act, is consistent with Thomas Jefferson's belief
that patents should not be granted for "small details, obvious improvements, or
frivolous devices." Id. at 9.
48. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891)
(noting that whether "that impalpable something which distinguishes invention from
simple mechanical skill" exists is a question often difficult to determine and "which
cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition").
49. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52- Id. at 17-18.
53. See Ambiant Sys., Ltd. v. Shogun Int'l Corp., No. 83 C 3161, 1984 WL 1455, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1984); Med. Lab. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671,
674-75 (7th Cir. 1981).
54. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568,
1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796
F.2d 443, 447 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 59, 63; Edward Philip
Walker, Objective Evidence of Nonobviousness: The Elusive Nexus Requirement (pts.
1 & 2), 69 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 175, 229 (1987).
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written disclosure, which describes and defines the invention for
which the patent applicant seeks protection.55 The most prominent
requirements concern the adequacy of the written description,
enablement, best-mode, and claim definiteness.' To be an "adequate
written description," the specification must clearly describe the
claimed invention.5 In addition, the specification must enable one of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art to practice the invention as claimed
without undue experimentation.' Furthermore, the specification
must disclose the best mode of making or carrying out the claimed
invention known to the inventor at the time the application was filed.59
Lastly, the claims, which define the metes and bounds of the patent,
must be sufficiently definite to teach those skilled in the pertinent art
the scope of the invention to be protected by the patent.' These
requirements arise from the quid pro quo precept that to grant an
inventor a right to exclude others from use of the invention for a
period of time, the invention must be disclosed in such full and clear
terms to ensure that others skilled in the art may learn how to make
or carry out the invention and perhaps build upon this invention to
further advance the state of the art.61
B. Exploitation of Patent Rights
A patent, once granted, provides a patent owner with a right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention in the United States for twenty years from the date the
patent is issued, or the earliest application filing date from which the
issued patent claims priority.( The exclusionary property right
55. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). Section 112 provides in part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, dear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
Id.
56. See id.
57. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1089 (1998); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 70.
58. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 70.
59. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 72.
60. See Beachcombers v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1158
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., Inc., 894 F.
Supp. 844,858 (D. Del. 1995); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 73.
61. See 3 Walker on Patents, supra note 23, § 10:1, at 186; John W. Schlicher,
Patent Law: Legal and Economic Principles § 2.1813], at 2-58 to 2-63 (1999).
62. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 (a)(1)-(a)(2) (1994). Section 154 reads in pertinent part:
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granted by a patent provides the owner with the exclusive ability for a
limited term to exploit the patented invention for commercial
advantage. 63 For example, patent owners have the option to develop
their own commercial product based on the patented invention and/or
license others to use their patented invention in return for royalties. 6
If someone makes, uses, imports, offers for sale, or sells a patented
invention in the United States without the patent owner's
authorization, it is an act of direct infringement that is actionable
under the federal patent laws.65 Alternatively, one can be liable for
indirect infringement if he or she knowingly aids or facilitates another
in committing an act of direct infringement.6 Courts apply a two-step
test to determine whether someone infringes a patent.67 First, a court
construes the meaning and scope of the claims at issue.63 Second, the
court compares the allegedly infringing activity to the construed
claims.69 In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,7° the Supreme
Court held that the interpretation of the claims at issue is a matter of
Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States...
products made by that process ... for a term beginning on the date on which
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a
specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section
120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the earliest such
application was filed.
Id.
63. Although the patent laws enable a patent owner to commercially exploit his or
her invention, it "'does not create an affirmative right to make, use or sell anything."'
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Leatherman Tool Group Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
64. 6 Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 20:1, at 4
(3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter 6 Walker on Patents].
65. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994); 6 Walker on Patents, supra note 64, § 22:3, at 416.
Not every unauthorized use or manufacture of an invention constitutes an
infringement per se. Id. For example, use or construction of an invention solely for
experimental purposes, for gratifying philosophical taste or curiosity, or for
instruction or amusement are not actionable infringements. Id. at 417; Ruth v.
Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo. 1935); Schlicher, supra note
61, § 1.20[8]. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 87 and Brett G. Alten, Left to One's
Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop.,
Media & Ent. L.J. 837 (1998), for other examples of non-infringing but unauthorized
use of another's patented invention.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998); 6 Walker on Patents, supra note
64, § 22:7.
67. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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law that is to be determined by a judge and not by a jury."' In
response to that decision, trial courts now employ what is often called
a "Markman hearing" to determine the meaning of a patent's claims.'
Because neither the Supreme Court nor the CAFC provided any
guidance regarding when during a patent trial the patent claims
should be construed, trial courts have struggled to find the most
efficient and effective procedure for conducting the Markman
hearing. 3  The Markman hearing is significant because the
interpretation of a patent's claims may determine which party will
prevail at trial.7 If the plaintiff prevails at trial, he or she has a right
to a remedy for patent infringement,7 5 which may include an
injunction to prevent further violation of the patent owner's rights,7 6
money damages,' and attorney fees in exceptional cases.'
C. Implications of the Candor Requirement on a Patent
Because patent prosecution relies exclusively on the applicant and
patent examiner to determine the patentability of the claimed
invention, applicants may be sorely tempted to conceal information
that may be harmful to their filed patent application. Under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56 ("Rule 56"), the applicant and anyone else responsible for
filing and prosecuting the patent application has a "duty of candor and
good faith" in dealing with the PTO to disclose any known
information that is material to the patentability of the invention.79 To
discourage applicants from engaging in "fraud on the Patent Office"
by concealing information, such as potentially damaging pieces of
prior art that should be disclosed, federal courts have exercised their
power to render an entire patent invalid and unenforceable if such
"inequitable conduct" is discovered.' An invalid and unenforceable
patent is essentially dead and cannot be asserted against patent
infringers.8'
A party alleging that a patent is unenforceable because of
inequitable conduct must show by clear and convincing evidence that
(1) the individuals involved in the prosecution of a patent application
71. 1d. at 391.
72- See Frank M. Gasparo, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Its
Procedural Shock Wave: The Marknmn Hearing, 5 J.L. & Po'y 723,724-25 (1997).
73. Constance S. Huttner, Stephanie J. Kamerow, Madeline F. Baer, Preeya
Noronha, Markman Practice Procedures and Tactics, 572 PLIIPat 715,720-21 (1999).
74. Gasparo, supra note 72, at 724 n.4, 764-65 n.167-70.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
76. Id. § 283.
77. Id. § 284.
78. Id. § 285.
79. 37 C.F.R § 1.56 (1994).
80. Merges, supra note 19, at 751; Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable
Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 Harv. J.L & Tech. 37, 37-38 (1993).
81. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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failed to disclose to the PTO information material to patentability of
the invention, and that (2) such individuals intended to mislead the
PTO. 2 The failure to disclose material information must arise from a
specific intent to mislead, not merely from carelessness in the
performance of their duty.8A Because inequitable conduct is an
equitable issue, the matter is committed to the discretion of the trial
court and is reviewed by the CAFC under an abuse of discretion
standard.' To overturn a determination of inequitable conduct, "the
appellant must establish that the ruling is based upon clearly
erroneous findings of fact or a misapplication or misinterpretation of
applicable law or that the ruling evidences a clear error of judgmelnt
on the part of the... court."'
Despite the heavy burden required to prove inequitable conduct,
the doctrine is routinely asserted as a defense to patent infringement
on even the slightest evidence. 6 As observed by one CAFC panel,
the doctrine has been asserted so often that it has become "an
absolute plague" in almost any major case in which a patent is
asserted.' In addition to serving as a shield against a patent owner's
claims, inequitable conduct may also serve as a sword in the hands of
a plaintiff wishing to invalidate a patent.88 Because the severity of the
penalty often outweighs the penalty of falsely asserting inequitable
conduct, this doctrine has become an overused and potent weapon in
the hands of competitors seeking to quash a patent in court.8 9
Thus, in addition to requiring the applicant to demonstrate that the
invention, as described by the patent application, meets all of the
82. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd., v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
83. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1181.
84. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
85. Id. (quoting PPG Indus. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
86. See Glenn E. Von Tersch, Curing the Inequitable Conduct Plague in Patent
Litigation, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421, 422 (1998).
87. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 n.15 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco
Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In Kingsdown, the lower court found
that the patentee had obtained its patent by inequitable conduct based on the
defendant's argument that the patentee's failure to disclaim or reissue a patent after
being charged with inequitable conduct was proof of bad faith in the prosecution of
the patent-at-issue. Id. at 874. The CAFC found the defendant's argument "nothing
short of ridiculous" and held that "the district court's finding of deceitful intent" for
the inequitable conduct charge "was clearly erroneous." Id. at 875-76. The court
commented that requiring a disclaimer or reissue to avoid the adverse inference of
inequitable conduct would have a chilling effect on the patentee's efforts to enforce
its patent rights, and would further encourage the already widespread proliferation of
inequitable conduct charges. Id.
88. For an example of a plaintiff using inequitable conduct as a sword to attempt
to invalidate a patent, see Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
89. See id.; Von Tersch, supra note 86, at 426-27.
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statutory requirements for patentability, the applicant and anyone else
responsible for the patent prosecution has a duty of candor to the
PTO.9° Fulfillment of the candor requirement, as well as the other
conditions of patentability, can present a minefield of problems. Even
after the patent issues, the patent claims, which define the scope of
protection extended to the patentee's invention, and the examination
process can remain subject to scrutiny by (1) the PTO through
reexamination 9' and reissue 92 and (2) the courts through lawsuits. 3
Because the PTO currently limits the extent to which a third party
may participate in the reexamination 9l and reissue" processes, a party
may find the courts a more amenable forum in which to try to defeat a
patent. Depending on the nature of the controversy, certain courts
may be precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the lawsuit." The
boundaries on the ability of courts to adjudicate patent questions in a
lawsuit is discussed in the next part.
II. ADJUDICATION OF PATENT RIGHTS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS
When a complainant seeks to bring a lawsuit that directly raises
issues pertaining to the patent laws, such as an action for patent
infringement, the lawsuit "arises under" the patent laws of the United
States.97 If a lawsuit arises under the patent laws, then state courts are
excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the suit." Section 1338(a)
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1994) (describing the ex parte reexamination procedure);
35 U.S.C.A. § 314 (West Supp. 2000) (describing the inter panes reexamination
procedure); see also Merges, supra note 19, at 1123-26 (describing reexamination).
Reexamination is a process by which the patentability of an issued patent is
reexamined by the PTO in light of printed publications that raise substantial new
questions of patentability. Merges, supra note 19, at 1124. It can be requested by
anyone, including the patentee. Id.
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
93. See generally Chisum on Patents, supra note 27, § 19 (discussing defenses
against lawsuits to enforce a patent for alleged infringing activity).
94. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 305 (1994) (limiting third party involvement to merely
submitting prior printed publications that evidence substantial new questions of
patentability of the issued patent); 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 311, 314 (West Supp. 2000)
(providing limited opportunity for a third party to involve itself in inter partes
reexamination).
95. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Mossinghoff, 704 F.2d 1319, 1321 (4th Cir. 1983)
(noting that third parties cannot participate in the reissue examination, and that they
are limited to merely filing a protest with the Commissioner of Patents against the
reissue); Te Pas v. Geldhof, 112 F.2d 800, 804 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (commenting that a
right to reissue is an ex parte consideration for the Patent Office to decide).
96. See infra Parts ll.C-D.
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
98. See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897); see also
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876) (stating that the rights under the laws
of the United States may be prosecuted in state courts unless Congress confers
exclusive jurisdiction on the subject matter); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
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of Title 28 confers exclusive and original jurisdiction to federal district
courts to hear all cases arising under the patent laws. 99 Section
1295(a)(1), which is the appellate counterpart to § 1338(a), confers
exclusive jurisdiction to the CAFC to hear appeals from all district
courts.1° To help understand the bases of the modem goals sought by
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, this part will first
explore the history of the jurisdictional boundaries set by Congress for
causes of action relating to the patent laws, and second, examine the
context for the creation of the CAFC 0 1 Although state courts may
not exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws, they
may, in certain circumstances, address patent questions when they
arise under a state law question.1 2 The last section of this part will
describe the context in which state courts may exercise jurisdiction
over a controversy involving patent questions.
A. History Behind the Exclusivity of the Patent Laws
The exclusive federal jurisdiction of the patent laws can be traced
back at least to the Patent Act of 1800 ("1800 Act")Y Although
Congress did not expressly give "exclusive jurisdiction" over the
patent laws to federal courts in the 1800 Act, it has been construed by
commentators to signal Congress' shift away from the belief that state
courts should have concurrent jurisdiction over all patent law issues.",,
Under the prior Patent Act, passed in 1793, an action for patent
infringement could be brought "in the circuit court of the United
States, or any other court having competent jurisdiction. '"10 5 It may be
presumed that courts of "competent jurisdiction" included state
courts °6 In view of the fact that Congress expressly omitted from the
Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 509-10 (1957)
[hereinafter Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts] (explaining that areas such
as patent law are in the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994).
101. See infra Part II.B.
102. See Pratt, 168 U.S. at 259.
103. Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37.
104. See Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 633, 636 (1971) [hereinafter
Chisuln, Allocation of Jurisdiction]; Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, supra
note 98, at 510 n.2.
105. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318.
106. The presumption derives from the generally accepted view of the
consequences flowing from the Madisonian Compromise. Under the Compromise,
the Constitutional Convention "left the creation of lower federal courts to [the
discretion of] Congress rather than require them in the Constitution." Michael G.
Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995
Wis. L. Rev. 39, 39 (1995). It has generally been accepted that had Congress chosen
not to create the lower federal courts, state courts would necessarily have had the
duty to adjudicate federal law causes of action because the Supreme Court alone
would not have been able to hear all the federal cases throughout the United States.
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1800 Act the phrase "or any other court having competent
jurisdiction,"'1 7 commentators have inferred that omission to indicate
Congress' intent to vest in federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
infringement cases." Whether the rest of the patent laws were within
exclusive federal jurisdiction remained unclear until the Revised
Statutes of 1874, which expressly made "all cases arising under the
patent... laws of the United States" the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts.10 9
The original rationale behind giving federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction first over patent infringement actions and then over all
cases arising under the patent laws is not clear because the legislative
history behind the enactment of the 1800 Act and the Revised
Statutes of 1874 is scarce. One commentator has postulated that
federal courts were perhaps given exclusive jurisdiction because
federal officials perceived it improper to allow "a state court to annul
the act of a high federal officer."'' 0 Because patent invalidity could be
raised as a statutory defense to infringement,"' if a patent were found
invalid by a state court, it would necessarily impugn the action of the
federal officer who was responsible for granting the patent. The more
commonly accepted explanation is that Congress conferred exclusive
federal jurisdiction to areas of law such as patent law, because it had
determined that those areas of law have "special needs that [could
not] be met by concurrent state court jurisdiction."' 2 While the
specific reason why Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction to patent
law is difficult to ascertain because of the lack of legislative history,
the need for national uniformity of decisions and a heightened need
for expertise to decide technical issues that are often raised in patent
cases are among the two most common currently cited reasons."t 3
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997). Logically, state courts must be
viewed as courts of competent jurisdiction for the adjudication and enforcement of
federal law. See Martin H. Redish and Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 Ind.
L. Rev. 71, 79 (1998).
107. Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3,2 Stat. 37.
108. See Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 636; Edward H.
Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 313,317 (1972); Note, The
Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Cases Involving Patents, 31 Colum. L Rev. 461,461
n.1 (1931).
109. Title XIII, ch. 12, § 711(5), 18 Stat. 134-35 (1874); Exclusive Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts, supra note 98, at 510 n.2; cf Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra
note 104, at 638 (indicating that "the language of express exclusivity was thought to be
declaratory of existing law").
110. Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 637 (emphasis omitted).
111. See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109, 111-12.
112. See 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4470, at
676 (1981).
113. See Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, supra note 98, at 512; Chisum,
Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 636. Interestingly, prior to the Revised
Statutes of 1874, which explicitly made the patent laws the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts, some state courts had adopted the view that the patent laws are under
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Until the recent creation of the CAFC, uniformity in the application
of the patent laws clearly was not achieved because the circuit courts
often held widely different views toward the patent laws.114 The lack
of uniformity was exacerbated by the substantial number of other
types of cases that the Supreme Court had to confront each year,
which prevented it from providing adequate review of patent cases to
ensure national uniformity in the application of the patent laws." 5 As
discussed more fully below, the impetus behind the CAFC was driven
in part by a desire to address this very problem.
B. Establishment of the CAFC
On October 1, 1982, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
("FCIA") added a new court of appeals by establishing the CAFC."6
Prior to the creation of the CAFC, forum shopping in patent cases was
rampant because of the very uneven application of the patent laws in
different regions of the country. 117 For example, between 1945 and
1957, "a patent was twice as likely to be held valid and infringed in the
Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times more
likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second
Circuit."' 18 Based on the findings of the Hruska Commission, which
Congress commissioned to study the problems arising from the
growing caseload facing the Supreme Court, Congress observed that
the Court appeared to be working at close to full capacity, and that it
lacked the resources to hear enough patent cases to ensure the
uniform application of the United States patent laws." 9 In response,
Congress established the CAFC to serve as a circuit appellate court to
help guide district courts in the application of the patent laws. 20
the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts for reasons "which do not suggest any
clear thought that the federal courts had any particular expertise, ability to develop
uniformity of doctrine, or position to protect the public interest." Cooper, supra note
108, at 317.
114. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 6-7; see also Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, supra note 98, at 511.
115. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More
Than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 43,46-47 (1984).
116. S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 12. Although the Act was passed April 2,
1982, Congress included a transition period so that the Act would not become
effective until October 1, 1982. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
117. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 15.
118. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 7; see also Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 369-71 (1975) [hereinafter Recommendations for
Change] (finding that the major problem in patent law is the conflict between circuits
in the application of the law).
119. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 3; Recommendations for Change, supra
note 118, at 216-17.
120. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 3; Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg.
Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that a district court exercisingjurisdiction over a case under the patent laws must follow CAFC precedent).
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Although the CAFC's jurisdiction is not limited to the patent
laws," Congress clearly intended to make handling patent appeal
cases one of the principal functions of that court.'22 In particular,
Congress noted that establishment of this court should "increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law" and reduce the amount of
forum shopping.m Congress reiterated the conclusion reported by the
Hruska Commission that forum shopping not only increases the cost
of litigation, but also "demeans the entire judicial process and the
patent system as well."'24 The uniform application of the national
patent laws helps to reduce the number of appeals and makes that
area of law more certain for judges to make more reliable decisions
and lawyers to litigate their cases12s Perhaps most importantly,
Congress noted that by making the patent laws more uniform, stable,
and predictable, it would make business planning easier and foster
economic growth and technological innovation121 Indeed, it was
perhaps the economic difficulties facing the nation at the time the
legislation was being considered that helped fuel its passage."V
During the period prior to the passage of the FCIA, the budget deficit
was spiraling out of control, economic growth was stagnant, inflation
was hitting double-digits, and unemployment was high.128 Both
political and business leaders came to embrace the legislation as a
means to instill greater certainty in the patent laws and thereby spur
economic recovery through technical innovation.2 With those
objectives in mind, Congress created the CAFC by merging the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals with the appellate division of the
Court of Claims.'
C. Contours of the Patent Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Jurisdictional preclusion and federal preemption principles
circumscribe the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over
cases that are based on state law, but which implicate patent law
issues. More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) precludes state courts
from obtaining jurisdiction over cases "arising under" the patent
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
122. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1994).
123. S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 5.
124. Id. (quoting Donald R. Grunner, one of the Hruska Commission's patent law
consultants).
125. See id.; Recommendations for Change, supra note 118, at 217.
126. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 6.
127. See The United States Judicial Conference Committee on the Bicentennial of
the Constitution of the United States, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: A History 1982-1990 8-9 (1991).
12& Id.
129. See iL at 6, 8-9.
130. See S. Rep. No. 275, supra note 2, at 2.
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laws. 31 To construe the meaning of "arising under" in § 1338(a), the
Supreme Court in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.132
recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which was enacted before § 1338(a),
also employs the term "arising under" to delineate the reach of
federal jurisdiction.133 Out of respect for "[linguistic consistency," the
Court grafted § 1331 precedent onto § 1338(a) and construed the term
to have the same meaning under both sections." Thus, both sections
give federal district courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by
removal from a state court, "only those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law." 135
Determining whether a "complaint establishes.., that federal law
creates the cause of action' 36 requires a two-prong test. The first
prong is trivial - determine whether state or federal law creates the
cause of action. In most cases, "[a] suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action."' 37 If the suit appears to arise under state
laws, however, the cause of action must be further examined to ensure
that federal law does not preempt the state law cause of action) 3s The
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Section 1338(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts
of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
Id.
132. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
133. See id. at 808 n.2.
134. See id. at 807-09.
135. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28(1983). In addition, although it is less acknowledged, the Supreme Court proclaimed
that a plaintiff may not defeat jurisdiction under either §§ 1338(a) or 1331 "by
omitting to plead necessary federal patent-law questions." Christianson, 486 U.S. at
809 n.3 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22); Federated Dep't. Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (noting that even if a plaintiff pleads his claim
solely in terms of state law, if it has "sufficient federal character to support
removal ... [the courts] 'will not permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off
defendant's right to a federal forum"'(citation omitted)). Artful pleading most often
arises in areas where federal law preempts state law. See Salveson v. Western States
Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part,
731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The artful pleading doctrine has its principal
application in cases in which Congress has preempted authority over the subject
matter .... ); see generally Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., Artful Pleading and Removal
Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out the True Nature of a Claim, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 315 (1987).
136. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28.
137. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
138. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Federal Preemption in Intellectual Property Law,
453 PLI/Pat 95, 99-103 (1996) (discussing how a state cause of action can be conflict or
field preempted); see also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d
1318, 1331-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (examining circumstances when an alleged state tort is
preempted by federal patent law).
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following types of federal preemption can render a state cause of
action invalid:
(1) Explicit pre-emption, whereby Congress explicitly provided for
pre-emption of state law in the federal statute; (2) Field pre-emption,
wherein "the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it;" and (3) Conflict pre-emption, "where 'compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,' ... or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."" 139
For example, states are conflict preempted from extending "patent-
like protection" to items "which would otherwise remain unprotected
as a matter of federal law." 4
Determining whether the asserted cause of action necessarily
requires resolution of a substantial question of patent law to provide
§ 1338(a) jurisdiction is more difficult and poses a greater "litigation-
provoking problem. ' 141 A state law cause of action will not lie in state
court if § 1338(a) jurisdiction is present. Because of the ambiguity
associated with determining when relief "necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal [patent] law," it can be
sometimes difficult to understand when a cause of action arises under
139. Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted); see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983)
(noting that state law may be preempted by federal law expressly or by implication);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (stating that state law may be preempted by implication if the
"'scheme of Federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it ... "'(citations omitted));
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that when a federal law addresses
the same subject matter as a state law, the validity of the state law rests on
determining whether it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"); see also Nimmer, supra note 138, at 99-
103 (exploring the various types of federal preemption of state law claims).
140. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989). In
Bonito Boats, Florida had enacted a state statute that prohibited the use of molding
processes to duplicate unpatented boat hulls. L at 144-45. The statute effectively
conferred a monopoly on boat manufacturers to prevent others from making their
unpatented boat hulls. The Supreme Court struck down the statute on the ground
that it was conflict preempted because once knowledge of the hull shape was "placed
before the public without the protection of a valid patent [it is] subject to
appropriation without significant restraint." ld. at 156; see also Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (holding that an injunction, based on
state unfair competition law, against the copying of an unpatented article that was
freely available to the public is preempted by federal patent law); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (finding that the unlimited protection
extended by state statute against copying of an article, which was held to be protected
by an invalid patent, conflicted with the federal policy embodied in the patent laws).
141. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,470 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
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the patent laws.142 In Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design,
Inc.,143 for instance, the plaintiff had asserted, inter alia, a state law
claim for injurious falsehood.1" Even though the asserted cause of
action was created by state law and was deemed not preempted by
federal law, the CAFC held surprisingly that the state claim arose
under the federal patent laws.145 Accordingly, the asserted state law
cause of action had to be brought in federal district court.
To clarify when a case "arises under" the patent laws, triggering
field preemption, the Supreme Court in Christianson enunciated that
"[i]f 'on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are.., reasons
completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent
laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it
seeks,' then the claim does not 'arise under' those laws."'1 46  A
complaint will not "necessarily" depend on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law unless patent law is essential to every
theory supporting the plaintiff's claim. 47
Because the plaintiff in Hunter Douglas relied solely on patent law
issues to make out the falsity element of its injurious falsehood claim,
the CAFC found that the plaintiff's claim necessarily depended upon
the resolution of a patent law question, and thus was sufficient to
provide federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a). 48 In dicta, the CAFC
added that at least the following patent issues were also "substantial"
enough for purposes of § 1338(a) jurisdiction: infringement; validity;
enforceability; inventorship under 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256; attorney fees
under 35 U.S.C. § 285; revival of an unintentionally abandoned patent
application; and the right to file a continuation application. 149
D. Relevance of State Courts to Adjudication of Patent Issues
While state courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over
cases arising under the patent laws, they are not completely excluded
142. See Douglas Y'Barbo, On the Patent Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: A Few
Simple Rules, 79 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 651, 653 (1997).
143. 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1037 (1999), overruled
on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (overruling the court's choice of regional circuit law to determine
whether a state law cause of action is preempted).
144. Id. at 1328-29.
145. See id. at 1329.
146. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)); supra
notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
147. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810. The Court reiterated this point by stating
that "just because an element that is essential to a particular theory might be
governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire ... claim 'arises under'
patent law." Id. at 811.
148. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1329.
149. See id. at 1329-30.
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from addressing patent questions.' 0 It is well settled that state courts
may adjudicate patent law issues provided that they collaterally arise
under a cause of action over which the state court has subject matter
jurisdiction.51 As summarized by the Supreme Court:
[W]here a patentee complainant makes his suit one for recovery of
royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for damages
for a breach of its covenants, or for a specific performance thereof,
or asks the aid of the Court in declaring a forfeiture of the license or
in restoring an unclouded title to the patent, he does not give the
federal district court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under
the patent laws. 1z
A patent owner, for example, may assert, instead of a patent
infringement claim, which would be within exclusive federal
jurisdiction, a claim under state contract law.' Even if the defendant
asserted that the patent were invalid or not infringed, the asserted
defenses would not provide a basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction.'-
150. See 7 Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 23:5,
at 25 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter 7 Walker on Patents]. For examples of cases that have
permitted patent law questions to be decided in the course of adjudicating a state law
cause of action, see Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 635 P.2d 708 (Wash. 1981);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. GAF Corp., 419 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); ConsoL
Kinetics Corp. v. Marshall, Neil & Pauley, Inc, 521 P.2d 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974);
and Keladiro, Inc. v. Valve & Primer Corp., 177 U.S.P.Q. 796 (Cal. Super. 1973).
151. See Hathom v. Lovom, 457 U.S. 255, 266 n.18 (1982) ("We frequently permit
state courts to decide 'collaterally' issues that would be reserved for the federal courts
if the cause of action arose directly under federal law. For example, the state courts
may decide a variety of questions involving the federal patent laws."); see also Pratt v.
Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (holding that determination of
patent issues by a state court, which are implicated in a cognizable state law cause of
action, "is not beyond the competency of the state tribunals"); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co.
v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ruling that petitioner's
assertion that a Florida state "court cannot pass on the validity of a patent" was
wrong); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 1956)
(stating that the state court is "one of competent jurisdiction with power to determine
in a case within its jurisdiction questions arising under the patent laws"), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 937 (1957). For a review of various state law claims that may be asserted to
exploit rights enabled by ownership of a patent, see Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston,
The Road Less Traveled. State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright
Disputes, 19 St. Mary's LJ. 703 (1988) and Cooper, supra note 108.
152. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496,510 (1926).
153. See Cooper, supra note 108, at 323. Care must be taken in the pleading
though, to ensure that the state law claim is not interpreted to arise under the patent
laws. See, eg., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that Hunter Douglas' state law tort claim of injurious
falsehood involves a substantial question of federal patent law, thereby providing a
basis for federal question jurisdiction).
154. See Am. Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916) (stating
that "[t]he fact that the justification [for the complained of conduct] may involve the
validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the question under what
law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract"); 7 Walker on
Patents, supra note 150, § 23"5, at 25. Although the CAFC held in Aerojet-General
Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buezrle Ltd. that compulsory counterclaims
filed in district court may provide the CAFC with appellate jurisdiction to hear the
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Provided the cause of action does not arise under the patent laws, a
state court can generally pass upon the meaning, scope, validity, or
infringement of a patent implicated in a state cause of action. 155
Attention should be taken when drafting a complaint. Depending
on how the complaint is drafted, a plaintiff may be confined to state
court despite the existence of patent law questions that may have to
be resolved to decide the asserted cause of action. In Luckett v.
Delpark, Inc.,156 for example, Luckett filed a suit in federal district
court contending that the defendants were infringing Luckett's
patents, and requesting relief for the defendants' failure to pay
royalties owed under a license. 57 The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, which the district court granted on the basis that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case.1 58 Certainly in this case, had a state
court reached the question of whether the defendants were infringing
Luckett's patents, and decided that their activities did not fall within
the scope of the patent claims, Luckett would not have had a right to
recover royalties under the patent license. More notably, the state
court would have necessarily determined that the defendants'
activities were non-infringing. Although infringement is normally an
issue reserved to federal district court,159 the Supreme Court,
nonetheless, affirmed the lower court's ruling and maintained that
Luckett's suit involved a contract right that did not arise under the
patent laws because "[i]ts main and declared purpose is to enforce the
rights of the plaintiff under his contracts with defendants for
royalties .... 160
Through careful pleading, there also are ways a plaintiff could bring
a state law cause of action attacking the validity or enforceability of
another person's patent, which do not arise under the patent laws. As
an example of one of the more troubling possibilities, a complainant
case, regardless of whether the well-pleaded complaint arises under patent law, it
limited its holding to district court cases, and left the principles governing removal
actions from state to federal court intact. 895 F.2d 736, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
155. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Am.
Harley Corp. v. Irvin Indus., Inc., 263 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that New York
state court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a licensee for tortious
interference with a licensing contract, notwithstanding the defendant's contention
that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the suit because it allegedly was
really a patent infringement suit), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Consolidated
Kinetics Corp. v. Marshall, Neil & Pauley, Inc., 521 P.2d 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that the state trial court had jurisdiction to consider the patent's validity in
the course of determining whether a breach of contract had occurred); Lee &
Livingston, supra note 151 (examining state law causes of action that may be asserted
to resolve disputes related to intellectual property).
156. 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
157. Id. at 501-02.
158. Id. at 499.
159. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
160. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 502, 510-11.
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could assert a state unfair competition claim essentially based on
inequitable conduct in state court. The CAFC in Dow Chemical Co.
v. Exxon Corp.161 opened this possibility when it impliedly ruled that
Dow's suit, which alleged that Exxon knowingly engaged in market
misconduct by attempting to enforce its patent purportedly obtained
by inequitable conduct, did not arise under the patent laws."6 Unlike
in Hunter Douglas, the CAFC found in Dow that the plaintiff's state
unfair competition claim did not turn solely on patent law issues, but
rather it depended on elements outside the patent laws.16' Thus,
under the test set forth in Christianson, Dow's state law cause of
action does not "arise under" the patent laws because there may be
"reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the
patent laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief
it seeks.""6
The CAFC's unfortunate refusal to acknowledge that Dow's case
"necessarily" depends on inequitable conduct flies in the face of
common sense. First, Dow admitted, after discovery progressed, that
its allegation of Exxon's bad faith turned solely on Exxon's alleged
inequitable conduct before the PTO."6 Second, the CAFC conceded
that "without the alleged inequitable conduct before the PTO there
would likely be inadequate proof of bad faith."'' Nevertheless, the
CAFC chose to cling to the well-pleaded complaint rule while turning
a blind eye to the case that would actually be litigated. Through its
decision, the court effectively sanctioned a means for plaintiffs to
easily side-step § 1338(a) jurisdiction and force state courts to
adjudicate cases when the plaintiff's right to relief, in fact, "necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent
law."167
Judge Clevenger, in his concurring opinion, argued that the fears
expressed in Judge Lourie's dissent are unwarranted.1" He failed to
appreciate, however, that a plaintiff can side-step federal jurisdiction
by merely wording its complaint to encompass both a patent and non-
patent law theory upon which the plaintiff could prevail, and then
proceed to actually try the patent law issue in state court.169 As noted
161. 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
162. See id at 1476-77.
163. Id.
164. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,810 (1988) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)).
165. Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., No. 94-572-SLR, slip op. at 2 (D. Del. Nov.
26,1996).
166. Dow, 139 F.3d at 1478.
167. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809.
168. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 144 F.3d 1478, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Clevenger, J., concurring).
169. The CAFC could have closed the loophole by embracing the principle that
§ 1338(a) jurisdiction should be determined by reference to the case actually litigated
(e.g., "well-tried case"). Even the Supreme Court in Christianson conceded that
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above, the Supreme Court has already stated that "a claim supported
by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis of
§ 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those
theories."' 70 Thus, contrary to Judge Clevenger's belief, Judge Lourie
may be correct in his assessment that the Dow decision may well
spawn the "generation of a staple state tort of interference with
contract essentially based on conduct in the patent office' 171 that can
always be brought into state court, thereby spreading the "plague" of
inequitable conduct that has already infected federal courts.17
It is generally accepted today that patent law is an area of law of
national importance. It was important enough that Congress created
the CAFC to help instill greater national uniformity of decisions and
to bring to bear the greater skill and expertise of federal court judges
to decide technical issues that are often raised in patent cases. 73
While the principle-if a case arises under the patent laws, then state
courts are divested of jurisdiction from hearing the case174-is easy to
grasp in theory, discerning, in practice, when a case "arises under" the
patent laws represents "one of the darkest corridors of the law of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction."'75  Through a strategically
"Congress' goals [might] be better served if the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction were to
be fixed 'by reference to the case actually litigated,' rather than by an ex ante
hypothetical assessment of the elements of the complaint that might have been
dispositive." Christianson, 486 U.S. at 813. The CAFC could have, for example,
suggested allowing for removal of the state law cause of action from state court if, in
fact, the state court found that the plaintiffs relief necessarily embraces a substantial
question of patent law. The Supreme Court noted in Franchise Tax Bd. that:
It is possible to conceive of a rational jurisdictional system in which...
original and removal jurisdiction [are] not coextensive. Indeed, until the
1887 amendments to the 1875 Act, the well-pleaded complaint rule was not
applied in full force to cases removed from state court; the defendant's
petition for removal could furnish the necessary guarantee that the case
necessarily presented a substantial question of federal law.
463 U.S. at 10-11 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court warned in
Christianson, however, that "merely because a claim makes no reference to federal
patent law does not necessarily mean the claim does not 'arise under' under patent
law." 486 U.S. at 809 n.3. The Court explained that "'a plaintiff may not defeat
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint."' Id. at 809-
10 n.3 (quoting Franchise Tax. Bd., 463 U.S. at 22). Plainly, the Court is admonishing
potential litigants from attempting to engage in forum shopping by "artful pleading"
to avoid federal jurisdiction. Yet, that is what Dow essentially sanctions by allowing
plaintiffs to avoid § 1338(a) jurisdiction simply by bringing a state law claim
implicating a patent law issue, and alleging in the complaint at least one non-patent
law theory under which it could prevail even though it may have no evidence to later
support that theory.
170. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (emphasis added).
171. Dow, 139 F.3d at 1481 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
172. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
173. See Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 636; Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 98, at 512.
174. See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897).
175. Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 638-39.
[Vol. 69
2000] FEDERAL COURTS AND PRECLUSION LAWS 731
pleaded complaint, a litigant can force state courts to adjudicate
patent questions, notwithstanding Congress' intent to have
controversies involving patent laws decided in federal court.
Moreover, if a state's preclusion laws would give preclusive effect to
the state court decision on the raised patent questions, a litigant could
potentially assert that the full faith and credit statute requires that the
state court's decision be given nationwide preclusive effect. The next
part will examine the full faith and credit statute, and the position that
courts have taken towards the view that a state court's adjudication on
patent questions should be given nationwide preclusive effect under
the statute.
III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT STATUTE
It is generally agreed that 28 U.S.C. § 1738,176 the full faith and
credit statute, functions as an interjurisdictional choice of preclusion
law provision in the state-federal context (wherein a state court
proceeding has a preclusive effect on a later federal court suit)."V
Section 1738 mandates that federal courts accord state court findings
the same preclusive effect as would have been given by courts of the
state from where the judgment was rendered. '78
The preclusive effect may be in the form of either issue preclusion
or claim preclusion.7 9 Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues that
have been actually and necessarily determined in a prior
proceeding."" While anyone may assert issue preclusion, it can be
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Section 1738 of Title 28 states:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory, or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions ....
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the Courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken.
Id
177. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Barbara Ann Atwood, State
Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit,
58 Ind. LJ. 59, 67 (1982); Erichson, supra note 13, at 984-85.
178. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985);
MGA, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 732 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Stephen B.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 733, 797-800 (1986) (demonstrating
that the full faith and credit statute requires federal courts to administer whatever
preclusion law the rendering state would itself use to determine the effect of the state
court judgment). Although the source of inteijurisdictional obligation is easily
identifiable, determining the content of the obligation has been more problematic. See
Erichson, supra note 13, at 989-1008 (exploring alternative choice preclusion laws that
might be applied, notwithstanding the full faith and credit statute).
179. See 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402, at 6
(1981).
180. Wright, supra note 9, at 724-25.
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held against only those who were a party to the prior proceeding.'
Claim preclusion, in contrast, applies "not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose."'a So long as the identity of the party from
the first action remains the same in a subsequent action, claim
preclusion bars any claims previously available to that party,
regardless of whether the claim was asserted or determined."
Although the scope of each form of preclusion is different, the
principal purpose behind both doctrines is to ensure the conclusive
resolution of a dispute."' Some of the more specific goals, namely
economy and fairness, as well as federalism and comity, sought by the
doctrine of preclusion are further discussed below.
A. Economy and Fairness
As noted by one commentator, "finality in judicial decisions is
desirable not because courts are infallible but because they are
fallible."'1 5  Without preclusion, legal disputes would continue
indefinitely through successive litigation. The finality of decisions
promotes judicial economy and fairness to all parties by preventing
repetitive and vexatious litigation and encouraging litigants to resolve
all of their disputes within a single litigation.1' 6 Moreover, ensuring
conclusive resolution of disputes helps foster more efficient allocation
of judicial resources by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
judgments,"8 which can lead to additional unnecessary litigation to
reconcile the inconsistencies. Lastly, the finality of disputes helps
promote greater trust in and reliance on judicial proceedings and the
judicial system."s
181. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
182. Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24 (1982); Wright, supra note 9, at 723.
183. Wright, supra note 9, at 723-24.
184. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); David P. Currie, Res
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1978).
185. Atwood, supra note 177, at 63.
186. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 384-85
(1985); Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 607-08 (1992);
Allan D. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Geo. L.J.
857, 858 (1966).
187. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 384-85; Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Vestal, supra
note 186, at 858.
188. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
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B. Federalism and Comity
In addition to encouraging economy and fairness, preclusion also
promotes federalism and comity between jurisdictions. 189  To
safeguard the judicial vindication of each citizen's state rights in his
respective state, the Constitutional Convention in 1787 incorporated
the full faith and credit clause into the Constitution.'9 The clause
mandates that each state court must afford the same full faith and
credit to another state's judicial proceeding as would be afforded in
the state where the judgment issued.19' In effect, the clause acts as a
state choice of preclusion law provision. 92 In order to create a "more
perfect union,"'93 this clause was incorporated "to alter the status of
the several states as independent foreign sovereignties... and to
make them integral parts of a single nation"'" by resolving and
coordinating the effect of judgments from the plurality of state judicial
systems. 95
Pursuant to the unifying purpose of the full faith and credit clause,
Congress enacted the full faith and credit statute.'" Although the
legislative history behind the enactment of the statute, which is now
28 U.S.C. § 1738, is scant, it is believed that the statute reflects
Congress' intent to "specifically require[] all federal courts to give
preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the
State from which the judgments emerged would do so."'" In Kremer
v. Chemical Construction Corp.,98 the Supreme Court observed that:
It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts
to employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of
189. Id. at 95-96; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).
190. See Rex Glensy, The Extent of Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 137, 146-56 (1997).
191. The clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 1.
192- See Glensy, supra note 190, at 153-54.
193. U.S. Const. pmbl.
194. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)); see also Thomas v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (noting that the framers of the Constitution
sought "not merely to demand respect from one state for another, but rather to give
us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the status of otherwise 'independent,
sovereign states'"(citations omitted)).
195. See Glensy, supra note 190, at 146-52.
196. See Erichson, supra note 13, at 983.
197. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); see also Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion
and Federal Choice of Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1209, 1219 (1986) (concluding that
"Congress intended to impose upon federal courts an obligation to recognize and
enforce the judgments of states equivalent to the obligation imposed on sister states
by the Constitution's full faith and credit clause"); Atwood, supra note 177, at 66-67
(sharing the observation that the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress, in
enacting the full faith and credit statute, intended that federal courts give full faith
and credit to state court judgments).
198. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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state judgments. Rather it goes beyond the common law and
commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State
from which the judgment is taken.'
Underlying this restraint upon federal courts is the need for comity.
As the Supreme Court explained in Younger v. Harris,2°° comity
entails:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways. 01
Comity in the state-federal context helps fulfill the important function
of preserving respect for states by the federal government and
preventing the potential erosion of state rights in the face of federal
interests. Because the determination of exclusive federal jurisdiction
issues in a state law cause of action "is not beyond the competency of
the state tribunals,"2" the suggestion that preclusive effect should not
be given to such determinations could constitute an affront to state
court judges 03 by undermining their apparent authority and refuting
their competence to determine these issues.2"
If a state would accord preclusive effect to state court findings
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, a federal court's failure to give it
the same full faith and credit arguably diminishes our system of
federalism. As the Court explained in Younger, federalism
represents:
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and... anxious though [the
National Government] may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, [it] always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States.2°S
A state court's adjudication of a case or controversy implies some
binding effect. 6 In view of some commentators' opinions, if state
199. Id at 481-82.
200. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
201. Id. at 44.
202. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897); see also supra
notes 150-55 and accompanying text (describing circumstances when state tribunals
may address patent questions).
203. Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial
Power 345 (1990).
204. Id.
205. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
206. See Wright, supra note 9, at 736. While Professor Ronan E. Degnan also
makes this comment in the context of state courts respecting federal court judgments,
the argument is equally applicable in the context of federal courts respecting state
court judgments. See Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741,
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court proceedings were not accorded "at least the potential effect of
precluding later relitigation of the same claims and issues[, it] would
constitute something other than the exercise of the judicial power."'
Consider, for instance, a state court that held that Company X owed
patent royalties to Company Y. And, assume the court rejected
Company X's contention that Company Y's patent was invalid and
unenforceable. According to the Supreme Court in Baker v. General
Motors Corp.,201 "[r]egarding judgments... the full faith and credit
obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a
court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons
governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the
land." Although state courts may not have direct jurisdictional
authority over patent validity, they have indirect adjudicatory
authority over that subject matter provided it is raised collaterally in a
state cause of action over which they do have jurisdiction. Arguably,
a federal court should not then be allowed to subsequently reevaluate
the patent and potentially hold the patent invalid because to do so
would eviscerate the force behind the state court judgment, which is
grounded on the principle that the court is providing relief to
Company Y for royalties owed on a supposedly good patent.
Considerations of judicial economy, fairness to all parties by
preventing repetitive and vexatious litigation, and the ideals of
federalism and comity suggest that federal courts should strictly
adhere to the full faith and credit statute. However, countervailing
considerations, including the Congressional goals sought by making
the patent laws the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and
creating the CAFC, suggest that state courts should not have the final
say on patent questions raised in a litigation. These conflicting
considerations have made it difficult for courts to develop a coherent
body of law on this issue. 10 The few cases before the Supreme Court
and CAFC that have broached this issue are discussed in the next
part.
768-69 (1976).
207. Wright, supra note 9, at 736.
208. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
209. Id. at 233.
210. For decisions holding or indicating that state court judgments on exclusive
jurisdiction issues should be honored in federal actions, see, for example, MGA, Inc.
v. Gen Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729,733 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Cawley v. Swearer, No. 90-
1981, 1991 WL 108725, at *2 (6th Cir. June 20, 1991); Forty, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc.,
837 F.2d 259,265 (6th Cir. 1988); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510,
512-13 (3d Cir. 1956). For decisions holding or indicating that state court judgments
on exclusive jurisdiction issues should not be honored, see, for example, In re
McMillan, 579 F.2d 289,294 (3d Cir. 1978); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hendry Corp.,
391 F.2d 13,18 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 US. 978 (1968).
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IV. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A STATE COURT JUDGMENT ON
PATENT ISSUES IN FEDERAL COURT: OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CAFC
A strict application of the full faith and credit statute suggests that a
final judgment about patent issues decided in a state court suit may
later preclude the losing party from litigating the same issues in
federal court. In addition, a patent issue that could have been raised
as a defense against a state law cause of action, but which was not
asserted, may also potentially later bar a federal claim premised on
the unraised issue.211 Furthermore, strict adherence to the full faith
and credit statute could open the door for state courts to render legal
judgments on patents without an appropriate avenue for an appellant
to seek review of the decision by the CAFC. 12 Unfortunately, the
implications of the full faith and credit statute for state court
adjudication of patent issues remains largely unexplored by courts.
Consequently, great uncertainty remains regarding the consequences
of a state court adjudication on patent questions. Because neither the
Supreme Court nor the CAFC have clearly articulated the preclusive
scope that federal courts should give to state court findings on patent
law issues, courts have not been able to develop a coherent or
principled body of law in this area.21 3 This part will first review the
opinions offered by the CAFC and Supreme Court on this subject.
Although the Supreme Court suggested in Becher v. Contoure
Laboratories, Inc. 214 that full faith and credit ought to be given to a
state court adjudication of patent questions, this part will demonstrate
that Becher should not be considered controlling precedent. In
addition, this part will review the test that the Court has set forth to
determine when full faith and credit should be given to a state court
decision, and will examine why a different test should be applied.
211. Consider, for example, that Company X sued Company Y in Illinois state
court for royalties allegedly owed on a patent. Company Y asserts that royalties are
not owed, because its activities do not fall within the scope of the asserted patent (e.g.,
it is engaging in non-infringing activity). The state court finds for Company X. After
final judgment, Company Y realizes that grounds may exist to claim that the
assignment to Company X of the asserted patent is invalid, and wishes to bring a
declaratory judgment action in federal court to invalidate the assignment. The
validity of the patent assignment is a question arising under the patent laws. Crown
Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 33 (1923). Potentially,
Company X may be estopped from asserting the claim in federal court since it could
have asserted that claim in the earlier state court proceeding. Whether Company X
would be estopped remains unclear. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text
(discussing the ambiguity of Illinois' doctrine of preclusion).
212. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895
F.2d 736, 739-41 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing limits on the appellate jurisdiction of the
CAFC).
213. See Atwood, supra note 177, at 71-72, 101.
214. 279 U.S. 388 (1929) (holding that a state court judgment on a patent issue
should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent patent suit).
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A. CAFC Opinions
The CAFC has yet to decide whether it would adhere to the full
faith and credit statute for state court findings on all patent law
issues.2" This stems in part from the relatively few cases that have
come before the CAFC, in which this issue is implicated.
Furthermore, as one critic noted, "significant procedural issues remain
unresolved" because the CAFC has been slow to delineate the scope
of its judicial power.216
While the CAFC acknowledged in MGA, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp.217 that § 1738 generally does not permit federal courts to employ
their own preclusion rules when determining the effect of state court
judgments,218 it embraced the full faith and credit statute only in the
context of state court determinations of patent infringement.21 9 It
declined to decide whether it would approve of adhering to the full
faith and credit statute for state court findings on other patent issues,
such as patent validity and enforceability.' This perhaps reflects the
CAFC's reluctance to allow a state court to destroy, in effect, a patent
via its ruling and the full faith and credit statute. Notably, the CAFC
cautioned that while "there is no limitation on the ability of a state
court to decide the question of validity when properly raised in a state
court proceeding,"'" "a state court is without power to invalidate an
issued patent"' m because "a state court cannot decide 'a federal right
created by federal statute. ' '' m
B. Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court's opinions are equally unhelpful toward
resolving whether federal courts are presently bound by the full faith
and credit statute on patent questions decided in state court. While
the Court has implied that Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc.224
215. See Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129,
133 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (indicating that it declines to render judgment on the res judicata
value of a state court finding on the invalidity of a patent).
216. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 5.
217. 827 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
218. Id. at 732.
219. See id. at 733.
220. See Intermedics, 804 F.2d at 133 (declining to render judgment on the res
judicata value of a state court finding on the invalidity of a patent).
221. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
222- Id.
223. Beghin-Say Int'l Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also Chisum, Allocation of Jurisdiction, supra note 104, at 637 (positing that
the reason for the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over patent law cases arose
from the "perceived impropriety in allowing [states] to annul the act of a... federal
officer"). See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text for a possible explanation of
what the court meant by this seemingly paradoxical statement.
224. 279 U.S. 388 (1929) (holding that a state court judgment on a patent issue
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offers precedent for holding that a state court judgment on patent
issues is subject to § 1738,2 Becher arguably should not be considered
controlling, much less persuasive, because it does not account for the
legislative and judicial developments that have occurred since the
decision was rendered. In fact, a closer reading of Becher reveals that
the Court's reliance on that decision for the proposition that § 1738
applies to state court findings on issues within exclusive federal
jurisdiction is faulty because Becher does not adhere to the full faith
and credit statute. 6
In Becher, Contoure alleged that Becher violated his employment
contract when he applied for a patent on an invention that he had
agreed to construct for his employer.227 After Contoure sued in state
court to enjoin Becher from using, manufacturing, or selling the
invention, and from transferring rights under the patent, the state
court found that the machine, which Becher had patented for himself,
was actually invented by his employer.m Before final judgment was
rendered by the state court, Becher attempted to then sue Contoure
for patent infringement in district court and asked for a preliminary
injunction against the state court proceeding. 9 The district court
denied his request for a preliminary injunction? 03° After his appeal for
preliminary injunction was denied, his suit was dismissed?231 Becher
eventually appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower
court's denial for preliminary injunction. 2
The Supreme Court held that preclusive effect should be given to
state court determinations of patent issues.233 The Court concluded
that just as "[a] party may go into a suit estopped as to a vital fact by a
covenant... [the Court saw] no sufficient reason for denying that [the
party] may be equally estopped by a judgment."' At one time, the
doctrine of mutuality25 would have made the Court's analogy
between the binding effect of covenants and judgments reasonable.
Under the doctrine, the scope of people affected by a covenant would
be essentially the same as in a court judgment. 6 Most courts today,
should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent patent suit).
225. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985).
226. See infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
227. Becher, 279 U.S. at 390.
228. Id. at 389-90.
229. Id. at 390.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 392.
233. Id. at 391-92.
234. Id. at 392.
235. Under the doctrine of mutuality, estoppel was effective only against the
parties to the litigation and those in privity with them. See Wright, supra note 9, at
727.
236. See id.
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however, no longer observe the doctrine of mutuality.z3
Consequently, there is a significant difference between the scope of a
covenant, which only binds parties to the agreement, and a court
judgment, which potentially binds the nation because of the full faith
and credit statute. Because of the magnitude of the binding effect in
the latter situation, it requires greater consideration of public policy,
which the Court does not appear to give in the terse Becher decision.
For example, while it is unclear whether the rampant forum shopping
observed by the Hruska Commission2 was prevalent at the time of
Becher, there is little evidence that the Becher Court either
appreciated the need for national uniformity in the patent laws to the
degree that Congress did when it created the CAFC, or recognized
the possible splintering effect on the patent laws that might result
from following each state's preclusion laws.
Ironically, the Marrese Court noted, but inexplicably dismissed as
though it was unimportant, that Becher failed to even acknowledge
§ 1738.1 9 After drawing a distinction between "[e]stablishing a fact"
and "giving a specific effect to it by judgment," the Becher Court
declared, without any hint of qualification, that the judgment "binds
all the world," i.e., the judgment should be given full faith and credit
by all other courts under all circumstances.' 4 By contrast, the Court
asserted that "facts on which [the judgment] necessarily proceeds are
not established against all the world."24' In the absence of any
presumptions, a plain reading of Becher suggests that the determined
facts that emerge from a judicial proceeding do not enjoy full faith
and credit, and may be relitigated in another court by the losing party.
This is clearly inconsistent with § 1738 and recent Supreme Court
opinions.242
Presuming the Court meant to qualify its statement to apply only to
facts that a litigant has a full and fair opportunity to litigate, Becher
still remains inconsistent with the current Supreme Court stand on the
full faith and credit statute.243 In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
237. See id. at 729.
23A See Recommendations for Change, supra note 118, at 369-71.
239. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,380-81 (1985).
240. 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982)
(acknowledging that "once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that decision precludes relitigation").
243. The Becher Court cited Manson v. Williams, 213 U.S. 453, 455 (1909), for the
proposition that "[a] judgment in rem binds all the world, but the facts on which it
necessarily proceeds are not established against all the world." 279 U.S. at 391. In
Manson, the Court stated that while a judgment may bind all other courts, if the
litigants were denied the opportunity to be heard on the question at issue, the "facts"
upon which the judgment was based are not necessarily established at all. 213 U.S. at
455.
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University of Illinois Foundation,2" the Court indicated that a
"patentee-plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that
he did not have 'a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and
evidentially to pursue his claim the first time"' before the results of a
prior judicial proceeding can be given preclusive effect.2 45 As the
Kremer court further explained,
[a] State must... satisfy the applicable requirements of the Due
Process Clause. A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own
courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and
federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to such
a judgment. Section 1738 does not suggest otherwise.246
In view of the distinction drawn by the Becher Court between facts,
which may not necessarily have preclusive effect,2 47 and a judgment,
which "binds all the world" without qualification, Becher implies a
result contrary to the current Supreme Court stance toward § 1738. In
light of this dissonance, Becher does not accurately represent the
current state of preclusion principles and it arguably should not be
treated as persuasive precedent for establishing that federal courts are
constrained by § 1738 in regards to state court judgments on patent
questions.
C. Test to Determine When the Full Faith and Credit Statute Applies
Although the full faith and credit statute mandates that federal
courts employ the choice of preclusion rules of the state where
judgment was rendered, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
there may be circumstances where an exception to the statute should
exist.2' The Court in Kremer4 9 provided a two-step analysis to
determine whether an earlier state court action should be given
preclusive effect in a later federal suit.u° This test was clarified and
reiterated in Marrese. 1 The Court specified first that the full faith
and credit statute directs federal courts to determine the applicable
preclusion law of the state in which judgment was rendered . 2
Second, if the preclusion law would bar re-litigation of issues decided
in the state proceeding, the federal court must then determine
244. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
245. Id. at 333 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D.
Mass. 1960)).
246. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482.
247. 279 U.S. at 391.
248. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381-83 (1985);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that a state court rejection of a state
prisoner's constitutional claims should not be accorded preclusive effect against a
federal habeas corpus claim in federal district court).
249. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
250. See id. at 480-83.
251. 470 U.S. at 380-81.
252. Id.
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whether support for an exception can be found to exempt it from the
provisions of § 1738.6
The Supreme Court indicated at least two circumstances where
state court proceedings should not receive full faith and credit in
federal court. In Kremer, the Court noted that "state and federal
courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to
[constitutionally infirm judgments]. '" For instance, where "there is
reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures
followed in prior litigation," re-determination of issues is warranted.655
The Court further indicated that an exception to § 1738 may be
recognized if "a later statute contains an express or implied partial
repeal [of the full faith and credit statute]."' 6 The Marrese Court
summarily concluded that state court findings extending to issues
within exclusive federal jurisdiction do not invariably make § 1738
inapplicable.25 The Court maintained that the "basic approach
adopted in Kremer applies in a lawsuit involving a claim within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."'
As straightforward as the test enumerated in Marrese may sound, it
is arguably not without significant problems, which the Court failed to
address. As to the first prong of the test, the Court failed to provide
any guidance when a state's preclusion laws are "silent or
indeterminate." 9 The Court disposed of this problem by arguing that
state court judgments will usually not have claim preclusive effect
because most state preclusion laws purportedly include a requirement
of jurisdictional competency.m
The argument the Court used to dispose of the problem posed by
the first prong of its test is troubling.26 First, the Court relied on the
provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to support its
conclusion that jurisdictional competency would dissolve most state
253. Id. at 381.
254. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482.
255. Id at 481 (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)).
According to the Court, "what a full and fair opportunity to litigate entails is the
procedural requirements of due process." Id. at 483 n.24. The Court added that "state
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith
and credit guaranteed by federal law." Id. at 481.
256. Id. at 468; see also infra notes 307-14 and accompanying text (discussing a
circumstance where the Court found an implied repeal of the full faith and credit
statute).
257. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380-81.
258. Id at 381.
259. Id. at 388.
260. Id. at 382.
261. See Mark A. Bailey, Applying Res Judicata in Antitrust Cases: Marrese
Provides an Approach, But Few Answers, 18 Ind. L Rev. 573, 591 (1985); Stephen B.
Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese,
70 Cornell L. Rev. 659, 663 (1985).
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preclusion questions in federal court.262 The provisions, however, are
neither the law of any state nor are they based on the law of any
state.263 Second, as Chief Justice Burger noticed, the Court's view of
state laws is too simplistic because "states that recognize the
jurisdictional competency requirement do not all define it in the same
terms."'  For example, in Illinois, the doctrine of preclusion "extends
not only to questions which were actually litigated but also to all
questions which could have been raised or determined. ' 265  Illinois
courts, however, have not addressed whether "'questions which could
have been raised' should be applied narrowly or broadly. '' 266 Their
stance is indeterminate because, like most state courts, they have not
had occasion to address the preclusive effect to be given to their
findings on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts.267 Consequently, federal courts are faced with the difficult task
of forecasting how a state court would rule, while handicapped by the
virtual absence of any state court pronouncements to provide
guidance on this matter.2u Chief Justice Burger suggested that in such
situations, where state law does not provide any clear guidance to the
preclusion question, "concerns of comity and federalism underlying
§ 1738 do not come into play. 269
In addition, as recognized by commentators, 270 the test enunciated
in Marrese may yield the absurd result that in some areas of law, such
as antitrust, where the state and federal law can be virtually identical,
a party could assert that the state court adjudication of issues vital to
both causes of action should not have preclusive effect in federal court
solely because of the jurisdictional competency requirement.27' Under
262. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 382.
263. See Burbank, supra note 261, at 663; see also Bailey, supra note 261, at 592
(observing that the Court failed to cite even one state that has purportedly adopted
the "jurisdictional competency" requirement).
264. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 388.
265. Spiller v. Cont'l Tube Co., 447 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ill. 1983).
266. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 389.
267. See id. at 381-82.
268. On remand in the Marrese case, Judge Plunkett observed that "[o]ur task is an
exercise in extrapolation because, of course, the Illinois courts never address issues
pertaining to exclusively federal lawsuits." Marrese v. Am. Acad. Of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 628 F. Supp. 918, 919 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
269. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 390 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
270. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 261, at 592-93 (observing that under the majority's
opinion, "the similarity of the state and federal antitrust statutes would be irrelevant"
to state preclusion laws, and that the jurisdictional competency requirement would
generally lead to the conclusion that no res judicata should be accorded the state
court decision); Robert M. Denicola, The Res Judicata Effect of Prior State Court
Judgments in Sherman Act Suits: Exalting Substance Over Form, 51 Fordham L. Rev.
1374, 1378-79 (1983) (observing that prevalent state antitrust statutes and federal
statutes are substantively identical, and thus federal courts should not refuse to apply
res judicata to bar a Sherman Act suit merely because it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts).
271. See Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy,
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the majority's view in Marrese, the similarity of the state and federal
antitrust statutes is not relevant.m If the principles underlying
exclusive jurisdiction were balanced against the principles of
preclusion, as done by the Ninth Circuit in Derish v. San Mateo-
Burlingame Board of Realtors, there may be little reason to deny
the preclusive effect of a state court adjudication under certain
circumstances, which Marrese fails to appreciate. 4 Ultimately, the
Marrese test is arguably flawed because, inter alia, it fails to be
sensitive to such situations where a party should not be given a second
"bite at the apple."'
The second prong of the test also is problematic because the Court
failed to provide any guidance to determine when a "particular grant
of exclusive jurisdiction justif[ies] a finding of an implied partial repeal
of § 17 38 ."6 Because the Marrese Court remanded the case to
district court to determine whether Illinois would bar relitigation of
claims in federal courtm it found it unnecessary to elaborate what
circumstances would suffice to support an implied exception to the
full faith and credit statute under the second prong of its test.Z7
Relying on Allen and Kremer, the Marrese Court simply stated that
"[r]esolution of this question will depend on the particular federal
statute as well as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the
subsequent federal action. Our previous decisions indicate that the
primary consideration must be the intent of Congress."2'
When Congress gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the
patent laws, it deemed state courts to be no longer jurisdictionally
competent to adjudicate claims arising under that area of law.
Congress' conferral of exclusive federal jurisdiction suggests that it
J., concurring) (stating that under the general principle announced by the Marrese
Court, it may be an "almost automatic rule" that a federal antitrust action would not
be foreclosed by a prior state court adjudication).
272. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 388 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (criticizing the
majority's opinion that state courts are not jurisdictionally competent to renderjudgments on federal antitrust questions despite the fact that the asserted state and
federal antitrust actions are virtually identical).
273. 724 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1983). This case was overruled by Eichman in
light of the decision in Marrese. Eichman, 759 F.2d at 1437.
274. See Bailey, supra note 261, at 598 (recommending that a balancing of factors,
which are implicated by the potential res judicata effect of a state court decision on
antitrust actions, should be considered); Denicola, supra note 270, at 1398-1402
(arguing that a balancing test should be applied to determine whether res judicata
ought to be given to prior state antitrust actions).
275. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stating that as a matter of "elementary fairness-a litigant given one good bite
at the apple should not have a second").
276. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added); Bailey, supra note 261, at 598.
277. Id at 387.
27& See id
279. Id. at 386.
280. Wright, supra note 9, at 43-44.
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had compelling reasons to shift the boundary of jurisdictional power
between state and federal courts.28 1  Nevertheless, according to
Marrese, the conferral of exclusive federal jurisdiction alone is not
sufficient to support an implied exception to § 1738. w1 In fact, the
Court in Kremer noted that it is "a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored."
According to Allen and Kremer, Congress must "clearly manifest its
intent to depart from § 1738."1 It is not clear, however, whether the
"clear manifestation" must be explicit or whether this burden of proof
applies with equal force to laws within the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts.' Certainly, most areas of law given to exclusive
federal jurisdiction generally do not contain explicit expressions of
intent toward § 1738.86 If one applies the stringent standard implied
by Allen and Kremer to laws within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the
test outlined by Marrese effectively devolves into a one-prong test,
dependent on a federal court's "best guess" of a state's position on an
area of law that the state probably will not have had occasion to
consider.
In summary, although some of the decisions by the CAFC and
Supreme Court suggest that full faith and credit should be given to a
state court adjudication of patent questions, neither court has
provided a principled explanation to justify their conclusion. As
demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, the Marrese test proposed
by the Supreme Court is too clumsy to determine when state court
proceedings should properly have preclusive effect in federal court.
The Derish court's approach of analyzing and balancing the
competing interests that are implicated provides a more sensitive and
reasonable approach to this determination. Using this balancing
approach, the next part will show that allowing federal courts to
choose their own preclusion laws, rather than binding them to the
281. See Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 98, at 511-15; supra
notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
282. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 381.
283. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (quoting
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); United States v. United
Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)).
284. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-99 (1980)
(analyzing the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and finding no clearly expressed
intent by Congress to repeal § 1738).
285. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (finding an implied exception to the
full faith and credit statute for federal bankruptcy law, which is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts).
286. See, e.g, Shreve, supra note 197, at 1239 (noting that "federal antitrust statutes
are silent concerning the possible... preclusive effects of state judgments on
subsequent federal antitrust cases"); Comment, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction: The
Effect of State Court Findings, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1956) (finding that legislative
history did not give much indication whether Congress' conferral of exclusive
jurisdiction to antitrust law rests upon a strong enough policy "to immunize the
federal courts from the effect of state court judgments").
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laws of each state under the full faith and credit statute, could allow
them to attain most of the goals of preclusion while satisfying the
congressional intent behind the exclusivity of the patent laws and the
creation of the CAFC.
V. FEDERALIZING THE CHOICE OF PRECLUSION LAWS ON PATENT
QUESTIONS DECIDED BY STATE COURT
This part will first demonstrate, based on a consideration of the
goals advanced by preclusion and the objectives underlying the
exclusivity of the patent laws and the establishment of the CAFC, that
federal courts should not be bound by the choice of preclusion laws of
each state. Rather, most of the goals and objectives may be
accomplished by allowing federal courts to choose their own
preclusion laws. This part concludes by examining the grounds that
federal courts may assert to escape the requirement that they follow
the choice of preclusion laws of the state where the state court
rendered a decision on a patent question.
A. Rethinking the Boundaries of the Full Faith and Credit Statute
Currently, no Supreme Court case either applies the Marrese test to
the patent laws or adequately weighs the interests underlying the
purposes of preclusion vis-a-vis Congress' intent to make the patent
laws within exclusive federal jurisdiction and to create the CAFC.
Abeyance of § 1738 could, in fact, satisfy most of the goals sought by
preclusion and Congress. As Chief Justice Burger keenly discerned, it
may be more "consistent with § 1738 for a federal court to formulate a
federal rule"' rather than relying on the "creative interpretation of
ambiguous state law."I
Quoting from a treatise, Chief Justice Burger observed that
"[u]ncertainty intrinsically works to defeat the opportunity for repose
and reliance sought by the rules of preclusion, and confounds the
desire for efficiency by inviting repetitious litigation to test the
preclusive effects of the first effort."' Allowing federal courts to
formulate their own clear federal preclusion rules, rather than forcing
them to extrapolate from silent or indeterminate state law would
more effectively promote the goals of economy and fairness sought by
the preclusion rules. Furthermore, it would enable the CAFC to
satisfy Congress' principal purpose for creating the court: to promote
uniformity in application of the patent laws.' Indeed, where
287. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 390 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
288. Id.
289. Id. (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4407, at 49 (1981)).
290. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text; cf. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 388-90
(acknowledging that all states that recognize the jurisdictional competency "do not all
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uniformity is a goal, a neutral experienced federal authority seems
better than fifty inexperienced authorities.29
While it has been said that giving full recognition to state judicial
proceedings by federal courts is "an essential component of federalism
and comity,"2" it seems inappropriate that state courts should possess
the ultimate authority to decide the preclusive effect their judgments
have on subject matter that lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts. It is fundamentally unsound to place in the hands of
states the responsibility of deciding when local rules and policies
should yield to competing federal rules and policies, particularly in
areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, which Congress has deemed
beyond the provincial competence of state courts.2g
Under the current statutory scheme, the relaxation of the full faith
and credit statute is necessary to effectuate the constitutional goal of
"promot[ing] the Progress of ... useful Arts 294  by ensuring the
uniform application of the patent laws, as Congress intended when it
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the patent laws and created the
CAFC. Requiring federal courts to adhere strictly to the preclusion
laws of each state would force federal courts to be subject to the
prejudgment of state courts on patent issues, and effectively allow the
state courts to infringe on the power given to federal courts, contrary
to Congress' intent. In addition, federalizing the choice of preclusion
law in the context of patent questions decided by state courts would
provide an institutional advantage of ensuring that the "talents of the
lower federal courts [are brought] more fully to bear on the
problem. ' 295  This resource would be wasted if federal courts were
bound by the choice of preclusion laws of the state where the
judgment was rendered.
define it in the same terms," and thus, there is intrinsically an uncertainty that "works
to defeat the opportunities for repose and reliance sought by the rules of preclusion")
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4407, at 49 (1981)). It is outside the scope of this Note to explore
what preclusive rules should be followed when a federal court faces a state court
judgment on a patent question. See Shreve, supra note 197, at 1224 n.81 and Note,
The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1978), for a review of various rules
suggested by others.
291. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 335 (1992).
292. Atwood, supra note 177, at 60.
293. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 23 (1963) (arguing that "[r]esponsibility for allocating spheres of legal control
among member states of a federal system cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than
with the federal government").
294. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
295. Laycock, supra note 291, at 335-36.
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B. Authority Supporting the Power of Federal Courts to Choose Their
Preclusion Laws
Discussed below are the grounds on which one may argue that the
federal courts possess sufficient judicial authority to decide their
choice of preclusion laws with respect to patent issues decided by state
courts.2 96 First, one possible statutory basis for an exception to the
general rule on the effect of a state court judgement in a subsequent
federal action may be found in the Rules of Decision Act. It
provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply."298 In view of the exclusive jurisdiction of patent law, a state
court should not be able to decide a matter indirectly by enforcement
of the full faith and credit statute when it would not have been able to
decide the matter directly.299 When a state action implicates patent
questions, the action represents a case where the preclusion laws of
that state should not be regarded as the applicable rules of decision
for deciding the preclusive effect of the decided patent questions.
Rather, federal common law should be consulted to determine what
rule should be applied to the problem.'
Second, past cases decided by the Supreme Court suggest that
federal policy may support an exception to the full faith and credit
statute. Although the Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors
Corp.301 decried the use of local policy to support an exception to the
full faith and credit obligation,' the Court embraced exceptions to
the obligation when faced with an "irreconcilable conflict" between
federal policy or statute and the consequence of giving preclusive
effect to a state court judgment.3 3 In Blonder-Tongue,I for example,
296. But see Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 Duke LJ. 171, 176 (questioning whether courts are an appropriate forum
for resolving choice of law problems).
297. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994); Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 509
(3d Cir. 1986), affd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 generally requires federal courts to rely on state law to determine the
preclusive effects of state judgments); Baxter, supra note 293, at 41; Harold W.
Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L Rev. 1191,
1201-04 (1967) (arguing that federal common law should decide choice-of-law
problems between fora with conflicting policies that implicate areas of national
concern).
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (emphasis added).
299. See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255,259 (1897).
300. See Horowitz, supra note 297, at 1205.
301. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
302. Id. at 234.
303. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996);
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86 (1982); Wright, supra note 9, at 733.
304. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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the Court attached no importance to the preclusion laws of the state
in which the action was brought, and instead, adopted a federally
formulated rule of preclusion that was based solely on federal
policy.30 5 Certainly, this practice of attaching overriding importance to
federal policy by federal courts is consistent with the shift in the
federal court's conception of "res judicata as a distinctly federal
problem, not in any way dependent upon the law of the state in which
the federal court sat."306
Third, the reasoning provided by the Court in Brown v. Felsen317
holds open the prospect that § 1738 may be defeated by implied
repeal based on the policies for the jurisdictional exclusivity of the
patent laws. In Brown, the Court held that the doctrine of res judicata
does not preclude a creditor from offering additional evidence in
bankruptcy court on issues which were decided in a prior state court
proceeding and that are related to § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.308 The
Court reasoned that giving finality to state court rulings on questions
within the exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy court would undercut
Congress' intent to commit those questions to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. 09 Congress had amended § 17 in 1970 to require
creditors to apply to the bankruptcy court for "adjudication of certain
dischargeability questions. 310  The Court noted that through this
amendment Congress sought, inter alia, "to take these § 17 claims
away from state courts that seldom dealt with the federal bankruptcy
laws and to give those claims to the bankruptcy court so that it could
develop expertise in handling them. 311 The Court expressly rejected
the respondent's argument that a state court collection suit is the
"appropriate forum for resolving all debtor-creditor disputes,"
including § 17 questions, stating that it would "force state courts to
decide these questions at a stage when they are not directly in issue
and neither party has a full incentive to litigate them" because the
debtor's bankruptcy is still hypothetical.312 Notwithstanding that
Congress did not expressly address the preclusion problem created by
pre-bankruptcy state-court adjudications, the Court concluded that "it
would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to
adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these § 17 questions [e.g.,
305. See id. at 349-50 (finding that the "uncritical acceptance of the principle of
mutuality of estoppel... is today out of place" and should be abrogated in view of
judicial developments and the federal policy "presented in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins-that
the holder of a patent should not be insulated from the assertion of defenses and thus
allowed to exact royalties for the use of an idea that is not in fact patentable");
Degnan, supra note 206, at 760.
306. Degnan, supra note 206, at 760.
307. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
308. Id. at 138-39.
309. Id. at 138.
310. Id. at 129-30.
311. Id. at 136.
312. Id. at 134.
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questions that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy
court] away from bankruptcy court and forces them back into state
courts. ' 313  Considering that Congress chose to remove patent law
cases from the jurisdiction of state courts,3 4 it similarly would
undercut Congress' intent by taking patent law questions away from
district courts and forcing them into state courts to prevent a litigant
from losing the right to contest possible patent law issues (i.e., as
defenses).
One might argue that the vitality of the reasoning in Brown may be
subject to question in view of Kremer, where the Court announced
that:
In our system of jurisprudence the usual rule is that merits of a legal
claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction are not
subject to redetermination in another forum. Such a fundamental
departure from traditional rules of preclusion, enacted into federal
law, can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress.315
It is worth noting, however, that this statement was made in the
context of federal law that lay within the concurrent jurisdiction of
state courts. Marrese, which dealt separately with law within the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, seems to affirm Brown's
recognition that a partial repeal of § 1738 may be implied if adhering
to the statute would frustrate the purposes sought by Congress'
conferral of exclusive jurisdiction.316
Fourth, a review of the CAFC's opinions toward its choice of law
rules further supports the conclusion that it has the authority to
choose its own preclusion rules, rather than be required to adopt the
patchwork preclusion laws of all fifty states, as § 1738 demands. In the
federal-federal context, the CAFC stated in Biodex Corp. v. Loredan
Biomedical, Inc.,317 that as a matter of general policy, it "shall review
procedural matters, that are not unique to patent issues, under the law
of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the district
court would normally lie. 318 It explained that this policy arises from
the "intent and spirit of not only our enabling statute but also the
general desire of the federal judicial system to minimize confusion and
conflicts[;] ... our mandate is to eliminate conflicts and uncertainties
in the area of patent law. '319 The CAFC clarified that:
Where there is an essential relationship between our exclusive
statutory mandate or our functions as an appellate court and the
313. Id at 136.
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
315. 456 U.S. 461,485 (1982) (emphasis added).
316. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,386 (1985).
317. 946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
318. Id. at 856 (quoting Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
319. 1d (quoting Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574-75).
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relevant procedural issue, that relationship provides an additional
reason why resolution of the procedural issue may be committed to
our jurisprudence .... Uniformity in the review of patent trials is
enhanced, rather than hindered, by our adoption of a single position,
rather than applying varying regional law to the issue before us.
Indeed, an opposite rule would be confusing, as the same patent,
asserted in different district court jurisdictions, might have the same
dispositive factual finding reviewed or not depending upon which of
differing regional circuit laws was applicable.3 20
Although the court focused primarily on the choice of law rules in
the federal-federal context, its reasoning is arguably more compelling
in the context of state preclusion laws and patent law adjudication by
state courts. Because each state has its own preclusion laws, the
possibility of non-uniformity in decisions by the CAFC is even greater
than with the regional circuits, which rank fewer in number.
Certainly, the CAFC is not without power to reverse the position it
stated in MGA, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.32' As the court has
developed greater appreciation of how "procedural" rules of other
jurisdictions may debilitate its ability to ensure national uniformity in
the application of the patent laws, it has modified its choice of law
rules. For example, before Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc.,3" the CAFC followed the preemption laws of the
regional circuit from which the case originated. 3  It declared in
Midwest Industries that it would abandon this practice and that it
would henceforth apply its own law.324 It chose to change its choice of
law rules, inter alia, "in order to serve one of the principal purposes
for the creation of this court: to promote uniformity in the law with
regard to subject matter within our exclusive appellate jurisdiction. ''325
The CAFC added that this step was taken also "to minimize the
incentive for forum-shopping by parties who are in a position to
determine, by their selection of claims, the court to which an appeal
will go. ' '326 Clearly, many of the very same reasons cited by the court
to support the choice of its own procedural rules in the federal-federal
context apply with equal or greater force in the federal-state context.
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors Corp.3z
articulated a distinction between the obligation to give credit to a state
320. Id. at 858-59 (emphasis added).
321. 827 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that § 1738 mandates federal courts to
respect a state court judgment on patent infringement); see also Midwest Indus., Inc.
v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (overruling by an en
banc panel its prior decision "to apply regional circuit law to conflicts between patent
law and other legal rights").
322. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
323. Id. at 1360-61.
324. Id. at 1358-61.
325. Id. at 1359.
326. Id.
327. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
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court judgment and non-obligation to enforce the judgment," which
could provide an alternative basis for justifying the conclusion that the
full faith and credit statute does not bind federal courts to give
preclusive effect to state court findings on patent questions. Drawing
upon examples from past cases, the Court noted that "[o]rders
commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a
[foreign forum] when they purported to accomplish an official act
within the exclusive province of [the foreign forum] or interfered with
litigation over which the ordering [forum] had no authority."' 2 For
example, although a decree concerning ownership of land in a sister
state "may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and obligations
running between the parties," the rendering forum's decree is
ineffective to transfer title.3 0 As the Court explained in Fall v.
Eastin,3 a "judgment rendered conclusive on the merits of the claim
or subject matter of the suit... 'does not carry with it into a [foreign
forum] the efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons. $1-
While the Baker Court indicated that the full faith and credit
obligation can claim-preclude litigants who are parties to the original
state action in a foreign forum, it affirmed the Fall Court's position
that "the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the
judgment itself for purposes of full faith and credit."3 3 In response to
Justice Kennedy's criticism in Baker that the declared rule was in fact
a broad exception to the full faith and credit obligation, which
generally forbids questioning a forum's judgment based on public
policy,334 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that "[t]his [rule] creates no
general exception to the full faith and credit command, and surely
does not permit a [forum] to refuse to honor a... state judgment
based on the forum's choice of law or policy preferences."3 5
Following Justice Ginsburg's reasoning, it becomes easier to
understand the theoretical basis for the CAFC's conclusion that while
"a state court is without power to invalidate an issued patent, there is
no limitation on the ability of a state court to decide the question of
validity when properly raised in a state court proceeding. ' 'n6
Although a state court may have the power to decide patent
questions, such as validity, when raised collaterally under a state law
cause of action, its determination cannot "accomplish an official act
within the exclusive province of [the foreign forum] or interfere[] with
328. Ld. at 235-36.
329. d. at 235.
330. Id. (citation omitted).
331. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
332. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
333. Baker, 522 U.S. at 239.
334. Id. at 244 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 239.
336. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
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litigation over which the ordering State ha[s] no authority. 3 37
Because the power to invalidate a patent lies within the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts, a state court cannot, through its decision,
reach beyond its jurisdictional power to invalidate a patent.
Moreover, it may not estop litigation in federal court on patent
questions, such as patent validity, over which it clearly has no
authority. If a litigant seeks to give a state court decision "the force of
a judgment in another State [or forum], it must be made a judgment
there; and can only be executed in the latter as its laws may permit. ' 33
At the very least, based on Justice Ginsburg's argument, the choice
of preclusion laws of a state do not necessarily, via the full faith and
credit statute, control the collateral consequences of a state judgment
in federal court.339 Thus, for instance, merely because a state court has
denied a claim for royalties owed to a patent owner, because it found
the asserted patent invalid, does not, as a collateral consequence,
necessarily render the patent invalid in federal court. Arguably,
federal courts, out of considerations of economy and fairness to the
litigants,"4 could nevertheless accord preclusive effect to a state court
determination of a patent issue provided that the state court had
jurisdiction over a state law cause of action that necessarily required
resolution of patent law questions, and that the litigants had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the patent matter at issue. Attention must
be given, however, to other factors which argue against giving
preclusive effect to the state court determination, including the
"special public interest" in ensuring that good patents are upheld and
bad patents are stricken, 1 and that the questions being addressed in
the state and federal courts are arguably different.
Differences in the competence of tribunals may properly lead a
court to limit the preclusive effect accorded a judicial decision. 2 For
example, in In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation,3
the district court held that it could not accord preclusive effect to an
337. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
338. Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312(1839)).
339. See also 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4469,
at 608 (Supp. 2000) (stating that the full faith and credit to a state judgment does not
necessarily control the collateral consequences that flow from a state court judgment).
Professor Wright notes that "[flederal law, for example, may treat a state nolo
contendere plea as a 'conviction' for federal purposes even if state law expunges the
conviction for all purposes." Id.
340. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
341. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330-31 (1971);
see also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc. 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993)
(acknowledging the "importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent
validity").
342. See In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 601-03
(D. Del. 1989), appeal denied, 904 F.2d 44 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and cert. denied, 498 U.S.
897 (1990).
343. 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989).
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International Trade Commission ("ITC") judicial determination of a
patent issue, even when affirmed by the CAFC.- In the instant case,
the court found that (1) the plaintiffs had a "full and fair opportunity"
to adjudicate the matter before the ITC; (2) the ITC followed rules of
procedure that were very similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and adhered to basic fundamental evidentiary principles;
and (3) the ITC made adequate findings of fact to demonstrate that it
understood the technical issues and substance of the suit. 5 Despite
these numerous factors, which suggest as a matter of equity that the
plaintiff should not be allowed to relitigate the patent question in
federal court, the court concluded that because an ITC proceeding
involves a question of unfair trade practice, the nature of the
proceeding is "distinct[ly different] in both form and substance from
the question before a federal District Court under section 1338; [and]
therefore, administrative res judicata is inappropriate."'
Unlike the situation where state and federal antitrust statutes may
be virtually identical, which might justify giving preclusive effect to
the state court determination,.17 state law claims that collaterally
implicate patent questions are not identical to federal causes of action
arising under the patent laws. The nature of a state court proceeding
on a state law cause of action, such as a contract claim for royalties
owed under a patent license or a business tort claim predicated on the
defendant's assertion of an unenforceable and invalid patent, is quite
different in form and substance from a federal cause of action arising
under the patent laws. Accordingly, notwithstanding the state court's
determination, a litigant should be allowed to relitigate questions
involving the application of the patent laws in federal court, the forum
where Congress intended those questions to be properly litigated. 31
CONCLUSION
In general, since most state laws are directed toward an intra-state
setting, it can hardly be expected that the problems posed by exclusive
federal jurisdiction would be adequately addressed by either state
344. Id. at 602. The controversy leading to In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser
Patent Litigation began at the ITC. Id. at 597. The plaintiff, Diversified Products
Corp. filed a complaint with the ITC, alleging that the defendant, Weslo Inc., had
committed "acts of unfair trade practice" by importing goods that infringed its patent.
Id. at 597-98. In its defense, Weslo responded that the asserted patent was invalid. Id.
at 598. The administrative law judge for the ITC held that the invention was invalid
because it was "anticipated and obvious in view of the prior art." Id. After the CAFC
upheld the ITC's determination that the asserted patent was invalid, the plaintiff
attempted to sue the defendant and others for infringement of the same patent that
had been earlier held invalid. IM. at 597.
345. Id. at 600.
346. Id. at 603.
347. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
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courts or state legislatures. Federal courts need to assume
responsibility for determining the balance between deference to state
autonomy and federal interests and to develop federal common law to
spell out the preclusive effect state court findings on patent questions
should have in federal court. As Justice Jackson wisely noted in a law
review article, it "seems productive of confusion [to leave choice-of-
law rules to the local policy of the state], for it means that the
choice.., depends only upon which state happens to have the last
word."" 9 To ensure that the patent laws are correctly and uniformly
applied, it seems prudent that we should "lift these questions above
the control of local interest and... govern conflict in these cases by
the wider considerations arising out of the federal order."35
Because of the ease with which a litigant could avoid federal
jurisdiction through artful pleading, as illustrated in the discussion
above,35' there exists the very real danger that the plague of
inequitable conduct will infect state courts and open a whole new field
of litigation in state court. If this occurred, the lack of expertise
among state judges in interpreting the patent laws will surely splinter
patent law, and reincarnate the rampant forum shopping that
Congress had hoped to stamp out with the creation of the CAFC.
Because all cases arising under the patent laws are subject on appeal
to review by the CAFC,352 a means exists to correct mistaken
applications of the patent laws by federal district courts and thereby
ensure their uniform application. No such centralized safety net
currently exists, however, for state court determinations of patent law
issues. 353 At best, a litigant could attempt to relitigate the patent
question in district court (assuming a favorable district court
interpretation of non-preclusion was obtained) and then subsequently
appeal, if necessary, to the CAFC.
Because most cases implicating patent issues are generally brought
in district court, district court judges theoretically should possess
greater expertise and ability to apply correctly the patent laws than
state court judges 4.3  Nevertheless, according to statistics released
349. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1945).
350. Id. at 28.
351. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
353. While the Supreme Court could serve as that centralized safety net, the huge
docket the Court faces effectively makes it unlikely that it would review a state
court's decision on a patent law issue. See Recommendations for Change, supra note
118, at 209-14 (demonstrating that the Court has insufficient resources to adjudicate
adequately areas of national law to ensure national uniformity). In addition, the
CAFC has jurisdiction only over appeals from district court cases arising under patent
law, and hence, has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a state court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (1994).
354. See Lee & Livingston, supra note 151, at 704 (noting that most litigation
regarding intellectual property disputes, including patent questions, is resolved in
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from 1997, almost forty percent of all patent claim constructions by
district courts since Markman v. Westvieiv Instruments"5 have been
overturned in whole or in part by the CAFC.3-6 Almost certainly, the
percentage of incorrectly decided state court judgments on patent law
issues will be higher. Binding the CAFC and district courts to follow
the preclusion laws of each state and the potentially shaky
interpretation of state court judges on patent issues will surely
frustrate Congress' intent to remove incentives for forum shopping
that had plagued the nation prior to the creation of the CAFC.3 57
More importantly, it would debilitate the CAFC's ability to instill
national uniformity in the interpretation and application of the patent
laws.35
8
The policy reasons underlying the exclusivity of the patent laws and
the creation of the CAFC strongly support an implied exception to the
statute. By allowing federal courts to adopt a single certain position,
federal common law could provide the additional advantage of
advancing the economic and fairness goals sought by preclusion
principles. All of these factors endorse the position that deference to
the laws of other jurisdictions is not applicable when "called upon to
resolve either procedural or substantive matters that [are] essential to
the exercise of [the federal courts'] exclusive statutory jurisdiction." 3 9
federal court).
355. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
356. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
357. See supra notes 117-18, 123-24 and accompanying text.
35& See supra notes 119-20, 125-26 and accompanying text discussing Congress'
goal of instilling national uniformity in the application of patent law by the
establishment of the CAFC.
359. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomed., Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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